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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to study the longstanding relationship 
between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of 
capital in Europe, taking into consideration country specific 
characteristics, which are essential in a context of corporate 
tax competition. We find that investors apprehend tax 
avoidance differently at distinct levels of tax avoidance. We 
provide strong evidence that as low tax avoidance firms 
engage in greater tax avoidance, the ex ante equity cost of 
capital decreases. On the contrary, when high-tax avoidance 
firms undertake greater levels of tax avoidance, the ex ante 
equity cost of capital appears to increase. The benefits for 
firms engaged in lower tax avoidance are greater from 2008 
onwards, during the period of financial crisis. These results 
confirm that in Europe a non-linear convex relationship exists 
between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. 
Finally, we explore the impact of institutional characteristics 
and results suggest that in English common law countries the 
effect of corporate tax avoidance on ex ante equity cost of 
capital appears to be lower than that in other legal origins1. 
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What is the impact on the ex ante equity cost of capital when firms deviate from (and subsequently 
move towards) their optimal level of tax avoidance amongst European firms? The effect of 
corporate taxation on cost of capital and capital structure has been discussed in the literature since 
the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), which motivated Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Myers’ (1977) works on capital structure choices and firms’ investment decisions, and Jensen’s 
(1986) on how debt disciplines managers, and behavioural theories of capital structure grounded 
in Titman (1984), amongst others. Nevertheless, the relation between corporate tax avoidance and 
cost of capital has received little attention. 
Recently, Cook, Moser and Omer (2015), in a study focussed in the US, propose a nonlinear convex 
relationship between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante (i.e., beforehand) cost of capital: when 
firms with a low level of tax avoidance engage in additional tax avoidance, a firm’s ex ante equity 
cost of capital decreases. On the other hand, when firms with a high level of tax avoidance engage 
in greater corporate tax avoidance, a firm’s ex ante equity cost of capital increases. Cook, Moser 
and Omer (2015) aim to address an optimal level of corporate tax avoidance, which minimizes the 
ex ante equity cost of capital, and thus enhances firms’ value. Despite the significant contribution 
of their work to understanding the longstanding relationship between corporate tax avoidance and 
cost of capital, theirs is a US-specific study, and thus their conclusions may well do not hold in a 
context of more corporate tax competition. Therefore, our study has a twofold aim. Firstly, to 
perform and recreate Cook, Moser and Omer’s (2015) analysis for listed European firms, in order 
to assess whether there is a U-shaped relationship between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante 
equity cost of capital amongst European countries. Secondly, to determine whether countries’ 
institutional characteristics (namely, their legal origin) shape the effect exerted by tax avoidance on 
the ex ante equity cost of capital. 
Firms’ expectations cannot be strictly measured, and often not all expectations are realized, 
therefore an ex ante measure of equity cost of capital is used. The ex ante approach is based on 
the constant dividend growth model and on the consensus of financial analysts’ earnings growth 
forecasts. In this study, tax avoidance is defined following the model in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), 
as a decrease of a firm’s explicit taxes.  
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced dataset that comes mainly from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 
including I/B/E/S, and comprises 4,630 firm-level observations of 1,498 firms listed on the stock 
exchanges of 24 European countries from 2005 through to 2014. To obtain a robust estimation, 
instrumental variables are used to control for the potential effects of unobserved characteristics. 
Two measures of tax avoidance are used to examine the relationship between tax avoidance and 
ex ante equity cost of capital – and tripartite our sample – low, medium and high level of tax 
avoidance. 




The analysis begins by confirming Cook, Moser and Omer’s (2015) U-shaped association between 
tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. We infer that as tax avoidance increases from 
lower avoidance to higher avoidance, the ex ante equity cost of capital appears to decrease, which 
indicates that investors’ perception of tax avoidance changes from inauspicious to auspicious. That 
is to say, investors recognize that benefits of tax avoidance to surpass its costs. The benefits for 
firms engaged in lower tax avoidance are greater from 2008 onwards, during the period of the 
financial crisis. On the other hand, as tax avoidance increases from higher avoidance to even greater 
levels, the ex ante equity cost of capital appears to timidly increase, indicating that investors 
perceive that costs of tax avoidance surpass its benefits. Thus, firms that exhibit low levels of tax 
avoidance are able to decrease ex ante equity cost of capital by undertaking greater levels of tax 
avoidance, whereas firms that exhibit greater levels of tax avoidance are able to decrease ex ante 
equity cost of capital by decreasing tax avoidance.  
The next tests focus on the association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital 
when country’s legal origin differs, and follows La Porta et al. (1998), the legal origin classification 
(English common law, French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil law). Given the 
current global tax competition, firms are more pressured to take advantage of mechanisms to 
decrease their tax liability, namely: profits shifting (e.g., Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel (2014)), 
increase subsidiaries in different jurisdictions (Hope, Ma, & Thomas, 2013), location decisions of 
new firms (e.g., Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2010)), to name just a few. For 
instance, Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel (2014) find a significant flow of income shifted from 
subsidiaries to parent firms when parent firms face lower corporate income tax rates. Results from 
this additional analysis suggest that in English common law countries, the effect of corporate tax 
avoidance on ex ante equity cost of capital is lower than that in other legal origins. 
Our findings make contributions to the literature in the sense that the results regarding the U-
shaped relationship between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital are based on European 
firms, whereas previous literature focus on US firms (Cook, Moser and Omer, 2015). Moreover, 
we assess whether the U-shaped relationship holds for different legal origins amongst European 
countries, and find out that such a relation may vary, according to countries’ legal origin. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 
3 presents the research hypotheses, the data and empirical methods used to perform the analyses. 
Section 4 reports our main results, and Section 5 concludes the study.  
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Cost of Capital  
The academic literature has been paying little focus on the relation between corporate tax 
avoidance and cost of capital, despite the significant literature focussed on capital structure. 




Recently, several authors have explored several factors that may be related with the association 
between tax avoidance and cost of capital, such as tax risk (Moore, 2012), investors’ perception of 
tax avoidance (Cook, Omar and Moser, 2015), equity risk incentives (Rego and Wilson, 2012), 
reputational costs (Gallemore et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2014), tax authority enforcement (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011), amongst others. 
Moore (2012), in a US-based study provide fairly compelling empirical evidence that the relationship 
between tax risk and firm value is concave and there is an optimal level of tax risk, leading investors 
to value tax risk, as long as the tax savings outweigh the tax costs. From the optimal level onwards, 
investors require a higher rate of return to engage in risky tax position when it comes to uncertain 
outcomes that may harm firm value. Similar intuition can be found when considering investor’s 
expectations towards an optimal level of corporate tax avoidance. Cook, Omar and Moser (2015) 
demonstrate that firms try to coordinate their actual levels of tax avoidance with investors’ 
expectations. The authors also find that the investors’ perception of tax avoidance changes with 
the level of tax avoidance, as they are concerned about the expected costs of increasing tax 
avoidance from favourable, to unfavourable, as the level of tax avoidance increases.  
Following Scholes et al.’s (2009) framework, Kim et al. (2016) find evidence that firms actually tend 
to converge to a certain level of tax avoidance, regardless of their initial level of tax avoidance being 
above or below their target level of tax avoidance. Kim et al. (2016) infer that firms with a low 
level of tax avoidance engage in additional tax avoidance at a faster rate when compared to the 
rate at which high tax avoidance firms diminish their tax avoidance. One can understand that firms 
face a clear trade-off when moving towards optimal levels of tax avoidance. 
Rego and Wilson (2012) infer that equity risk incentives and higher levels of corporate tax planning 
are positively associated, due to investors’ perception of risky tax positions as a valuable strategy 
to achieve higher stock return volatility which allows for an increase of stock option portfolio 
values. Recently, Hutchens and Rego (2015) study the relationship between risky tax positions and 
firm value, and suggest that more aggressive forms of tax avoidance are associated with greater tax 
risk, which leads to a higher cost of equity capital. The authors concluded that investors will 
demand a higher rate of return to engage in uncertain tax positions. 
Non-tax costs affect firm’s tax avoidance strategies (Scholes et al., 2009), which includes 
reputational penalties that may justify why some tax avoidance strategies are penalised by investors. 
Gallemore et al. (2014) provide evidence that there are no relevant reputational penalties due to 
tax-sheltering participation, after analysing a sample of firms publicly identified as tax-shelter users. 
Regarding reputational costs due to tax planning, Graham et al. (2014) suggest that reputational 
costs are a determinant factor for firms that consider engaging in tax avoidance. Their findings 
provide evidence that the unfavourable impact of reputational concerns constrain the extent to 
which firms undertake tax avoidance. Ayers et al. (2009) and Graham et al.’s (2014) findings are 
also consistent with the reasoning concerning the right side of the proposed U-shaped association 
between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital, as cost of capital is increasing in tax 




avoidance. According to Ayers et al. (2009), an increase of tax avoidance leads to greater 
information asymmetry, which results in higher cost of capital. Graham et al.’s (2014) results 
indicate that, from an optimal level of tax avoidance onwards, cost of capital is increasing in tax 
avoidance. 
In the Literature, there are findings inconsistent with those of Cook, Omar and Moser (2015) and 
Moore (2012). For instance, Sikes and Verrecchia (2014) demonstrate that a negative externality 
occurs throughout the whole economy when a relevant percentage of firms in an economy 
undertake tax avoidance – this will result in higher covariance risk between the market cash flows 
and a firm cash flow, which leads to a higher cost of capital for all firms in the economy. These 
results are reasonable, regardless of whether each specific firm does, or does not engage in tax 
avoidance. Sikes (2016) perceives a negative financial externality subsequent to tax avoidance 
embracement. There is an overall increase in cost of capital as more firms engage in tax avoidance, 
even for firms that do not engage in tax avoidance. They focus on the risk partition between firms 
and the government through taxation. Despite the contributions of Sikes and Verrecchia (2014) 
and Sikes (2016), we predict for Europe a non-linear, convex relationship between ex ante equity 
cost of capital and corporate tax avoidance, in line with Moore (2012), Cook, Omar and Moser 
(2015), and Kim et al. (2016) findings. Therefore, the following research hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The ex ante equity cost of capital is negatively associated with corporate tax 
avoidance for firms engaged in lower levels of corporate tax avoidance. 
Hypothesis 2: The ex ante equity cost of capital is positively associated with corporate tax 
avoidance for firms engaged in greater corporate tax avoidance. 
The Role of Institutional Characteristics 
For the fiscal years starting after January 1st 2005, the European Union (EU) Parliament adopted 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which require consolidated and simple 
accounts for all EU listed firms. The adoption of IFRS aims to contribute for convergence and 
harmonisation among European firms, and to allow for an improvement in the comparability of 
financial statements across countries, as well as in accounting quality. Despite the adoption, 
differences still persist across countries in terms of accounting practices, which inevitably are linked 
to tax issues. Thus, we explore the effect of legal origin on the association between tax avoidance 
and ex ante equity cost of capital. 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) claim that information asymmetry may not decrease when firms 
prepare their financial statements according to the IFRS, rather than to their domestic accounting 
standards. Information asymmetry affects accounting quality, whereas a country’s legal and political 
system has an indirect impact on both accounting quality and tax avoidance. Legal origin has been 
widely studied in the literature after the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998). In the view of 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007), legal origin indirectly affects tax systems, such as in common law 




countries, where financial reporting aims primarily to reduce information asymmetry, which may 
well implicitly affect investors’ perceptions and the cost of capital. Kramer and Lipatov (2012) find 
that corporate tax rates exert a positive effect on shareholders’ value in civil law countries, and 
have a negative effect in common law countries. There is not, however, clarification as to whether 
the effect on shareholders’ value is due to increases in cash flows, or in the required return, or 
both. The existent literature is not clear enough to distinguish the features of each legal origin in 
the relation between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. From Soderstrom and Sun’s 
(2007) work we infer that the effect of corporate tax avoidance on ex ante equity cost of capital 
may be lower regarding the role of information asymmetry. This inference is purely exploratory, 
thus we address the following research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital 
does not varies in English common law countries. 
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Cost of Capital: Other Effects 
To control for the relationship between tax avoidance and equity cost of capital, there are several 
contributions in the Literature that should be highlighted. For instance, there is evidence that 
investors may perceive positively aggressive tax reporting. El Ghoul et al. (2011) find that there is 
a negative association between tax authority enforcement and cost of equity capital as an increase 
in tax authority enforcement will generate a decrease in the cost of equity, thus increasing firm 
value.  Most recently, Klassen, Lisowsky and Mescall (2016) study the association between the tax 
preparer type and firms’ tax aggressiveness, considering the auditor, external non-auditor, and 
internal tax department as possible parties responsible for a firm’s tax compliance function. The 
authors find that firms require more aggressive tax positions when the party responsible for the 
firm’s tax compliance function is an external non-auditor or the internal tax department. 
Cook et al. (2008) examine whether managers differ investments in tax planning in order to 
decrease their effective tax rates. That is to say, if a firm’s earnings are managed through changes 
in their effective tax rates, mainly between the third and the fourth quarter. The authors study the 
effect of auditor-provided tax services and find that the amount of tax fees paid to external auditors 
is directly related to a significant decrease in the effective tax rates between the two quarters. 
A firm with greater accounting information quality is able to assess its cash flows more efficiently, 
which increases information certainty and allows for a decrease in the cost of equity capital. Allen 
et al. (2016) and Chen and Lin (2014) investigate the effect of financial analysts coverage on 
corporate tax avoidance. The evidence for the negative impact of analyst coverage on tax avoidance 
is clearer for firms that combine distinct factors such as weaker corporate governance, opaque 
information environments and greater reputational concerns. Chen and Lin (2014) find that firms 
which experience an exogenous reduction in the number of analysts following the firm, engage in 
greater tax avoidance when compared to firms that do not face this exogenous reduction of analyst 
coverage. Allen et al. (2016) demonstrate that the negative effect of financial analysts on corporate 




tax avoidance suggests that financial analysts’ monitoring constrains corporate tax avoidance – 
financial analysts diffuse firm’s private information to market participants, which potentially 
increases the probability of publicly revealing a firm’s tax avoidance conduct - such that firms that 
are monitored by financial analysts tend to undertake less aggressive tax avoidance positions. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) demonstrate that “the implied cost of equity capital is increasing in leverage”, 
which means that leverage has a positive effect in the cost of equity as long as we are at an optimal 
level where the after-tax return on equity outweighs the after-tax return on debt. On the one 
hand, “the effect of leverage on the firm’s cost of equity is decreasing in the firm’s tax benefit from 
debt” (Dhaliwal et al. 2006), such that the corporate taxes have a negative impact on the risk 
premium from leverage, as long as we are at an optimal level in which the after-tax return on equity 
outweighs the after-tax return on debt – thus, as the corporate tax benefit from the interest 
expense deduction increases, the effect of leverage on cost of equity decreases, the tax benefit 
from debt allows for a decrease in the cost, if equity and increases market value. 
Data and Research Design 
Sample Selection 
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced dataset that comes mainly from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 
including I/B/E/S. Sample selection initiated with data from all listed firms on the principal stock 
indexes of all European countries. The initial sample of 2,652 firms was narrowed down after the 
exclusion of financial firms, and firms with insufficient data to calculate the tax avoidance measures, 
the measure of ex ante equity cost of capital, and control variables. The final sample comprises 
4,630 firm-year observations of 1,498 firms listed on the stock exchanges of 24 European countries. 
The period of study is from 2005 to 2014, covering the whole period of accounting harmonisation 
in Europe, as well as the financial crisis. Table 2 sets out the sample composition by country. 
Measuring Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital 
Following Cook, Moser and Omer (2015), Equity Cost of Capital is generated as a measure of ex 
ante equity cost of capital, as defined in Easton (2004). The measure aims to attain a forecast for 




                                                                                              (1) 
in which 𝑃𝑡 is the price of the stock in December of year t; 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆 is forecasted earnings 
per share for future period t+1, and t+2. Equity Cost of Capital is the measure of estimated ex ante 
equity cost of capital for t+1. Equation (1) is adapted to obtain the estimation of Equity Cost of Capital: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  √
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 −  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
                                                      (2) 




Easton (2004) demonstrates that in order to obtain Equity Cost of Capital, which is the solution of 
this quadratic equation, one must rely on the observed prices and forecasts of earnings and 
dividends. Earnings forecasts are not available for many firms because several firms do not have 
analysts’ coverage. Moreover, equation (2) cannot be solved when 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1is greater than 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2. As investment decisions have to be made beforehand of knowing all of the 
significant information, investors must rely on expected or forecasted cost of capital instead of the 
actual cost of capital. We use the ex ante approach because the ex post cost of capital would imply 
a world of more certainty.  
In all estimations, the dependent variable is Equity Cost of Capital. However, to assess the non-linear, 
convex relationship between ex ante equity cost of capital and tax avoidance, our main independent 
variable of interest, we split our sample to distinguish firms with: (i) lower tax avoidance; (ii) 
medium level of tax avoidance, and; (iii) higher tax avoidance. 
Measuring Tax Avoidance 
TaxAv comprises the measures of tax avoidance: either cash effective tax rate (CETR), or book 
effective tax rate (BETR). Cash effective tax rate reveals the actual cash tax payments to the tax 
administration for a firm’s certain level of pre-tax income. Following Dyreng et al. (2008), CETR is 
computed as cash taxes paid each period divided by the corresponding pre-tax book income. CETR 
is used instead of its long-run version (LCETR), as we have an unbalanced sample in this study, so it 
is difficult to track the cash effective tax rate over a long time period for several firms. The second 
measure, a firm’s book effective tax rate (BETR), is computed as tax expense divided by pre-tax 
book income. As higher CETR and BETR prompt lower levels of tax avoidance, CETR and BETR is 
multiplied by -1, such that tax avoidance is increasing in CETR and BETR – this measure varies in 
the range -1 and 0. 
Research Design 
This section describes the conducted research design. To infer the association between tax 
avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital and to test the veracity of our research hypotheses, 
the following Ordinary Least Squares regression model with robust standard errors was estimated: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵_𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵_ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡                                                     (3)                         




The dependent variable Equity Cost of Capital is the ex ante equity cost of capital from Easton (2004), 
per firm i, listed in country c, for the year t+1, as described in section 0. We conjecture that this 
variable is affected by tax avoidance, measured as either CETR or BETR. We predict a U-shaped 
relationship between ex ante equity cost of capital and tax avoidance (measured by the coefficient 
𝛽1), suggesting that when firms with low levels of tax avoidance engage in additional corporate tax 
avoidance, their ex ante equity cost of capital decreases (H1); whereas, when firms with high levels 
of tax avoidance engage in more tax avoidance, firms’ ex ante equity cost of capital increases (H2).  
As prior literature endorses, several variables may affect Equity Cost of Capital. As in Gebhardt et 
al.’s (2001) work, a proxy for the log of the book-to-market ratio (LnBMRatio) is included. The 
three Fama and French (1993) factors (BMKT, BSMB and BHML) are included in order to control 
for firm’s risk. As prior literature suggests that firms comprising higher risk usually have greater ex 
ante equity cost of capital, we expect positive coefficients for the three factors. The three factors 
were estimated per each firm and year, using the following OLS model:  
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑙 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                                     (4) 
where, 𝑅𝑖 is the stock rate of return, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk free rate of return and 𝑅𝑚 is the market 
portfolio’s rate of monthly return. 𝑆𝑀𝐵 (small minus big) measures the spread in returns between 
small capitalisation over large capitalisation firms, whereas 𝐻𝑀𝐿 (high minus low book-to-market 
ratio) measures value stocks over growth stocks. Data on all dependent variables in equation (4) 
was obtained from Kenneth R. French - Data Library, which was computed based on portfolios of 
companies from 16 European countries.2 𝑅𝑖 was obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon. We 
estimated the three Fama and French (1993) factors for all firms in the sample, per month, grouped 
monthly data (by mean) per year, and added to Equation (3) the coefficients 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 , and ℎ𝑖 , which 
where further labelled as BMKT, BSMB, and BHML, respectively. 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2006), we control for leverage (Leverage) which is defined as long-term 
debt scaled by total assets. The trade-off theory on capital structure endorses that a U-shaped 
relation exists between leverage and cost of capital Modigliani and Miller (1963), depending on 
whether the level of leverage is higher or lower that an optimal level. Consequently, we do not 
conjecture a signal for the variable Leverage. In addition, to control for tax avoidance due to 
depreciation deductions we include PPEGT, gross property plant and equipment divided by total 
assets. Following Hutchens and Rego (2015), we comprise control variables for analyst forecast 
bias (Forecast_Bias) and expect positive coefficients for Forecast_Bias, as higher analyst forecast bias 
gives rise to greater ex ante equity cost of capital. As pointed out by Allen et al. (2016) and Chen 
and Lin (2014), the number of analysts following firms play an important role on tax avoidance and, 
consequently, in the accuracy of estimated ex ante equity cost of capital. Thus, the variable 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 
captures the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts. Total Accruals (TA) aims to capture 
                                                 
2 Data was taken from the website http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 




tax avoidance arising due to earnings management, and it is computed as earnings before taxes 
minus operational cash flow, scaled by lagged total assets. 
To control for absent country-level factors, we apply a fixed effect specification for country, 
industry and year. In order to infer these cross-country differences, we perform a more 
comprehensive analysis concerning the effect of legal origin on the association between tax 
avoidance and cost of capital, by grouping countries according to their legal origin following La 
Porta et al. (1998). To assess the presence of multicollinearity we conducted the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) test. Typically, a VIF value above 10 is considered a signal of a multicollinearity problem. 
In all estimations in this paper there are no evidence of multicollinearity amongst predictors, as the 
average of the VIF values for all estimations varies between 2.03 and 2.60. We also assessed for 
differences in variance error terms across observations, in order to test for homoscedasticity of 
errors. Nevertheless, as presented in all Tables, they are robust standard errors. Furthermore, 
statistical tests were performed to assess for normality of the error distribution. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical model. The mean 
(median) firm in the sample exhibits an ex ante Equity Cost of Capital of 11.1 percent (10.0 percent), 
congruous with Easton (2004). Equity Cost of Capital varies from 0 to 36.7 percent and presents a 
standard deviation of 0.078. For the entire sample of 4,630 observations, we find that the mean 
(median) firm has a cash effective tax rate (CETR) of -29.3 percent (-26.4 percent), while the mean 
(median) book effective tax rate (BETR) is of -18.6 percent (-13.9 percent). The correlation matrix 
(not reported) suggest that Equity Cost of Capital is significantly correlated with BETR (corr: -0.057; 
t-stat -2.22), while the correlation with CETR is also negative (corr: -0.037; t-stat -1.22) but not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, perceivably due to the proposed non-linear association 
between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. 
Empirical Results 
Ex ante Equity Cost of Capital and Tax Avoidance 
In Panels A and B of Table 3 we investigate whether ex ante equity cost of capital varies with the 
level of tax avoidance.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 forecast that the relationship between tax avoidance 
and ex ante equity cost of capital varies across the corporate tax avoidance distribution. Hence, to 
test these hypotheses, we tripartite our sample into terciles, and analyse the association between 
tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital for low, medium and high levels of tax avoidance. 
In both Panels the dependent variable is Equity Cost of Capital. In Column (1) we include Model 3 
and add two interaction terms, both of which signalling different levels of tax avoidance. CETR Low 
is firstly computed as a dummy variable taking the value one for firms engaged in lower tax 
avoidance (first tercile), and is then interacted with CETR. Therefore, CETR Low takes the value of 




CETR for less tax avoidance firms, and zero otherwise. The variable CETR High follows similar 
procedure, although comprises only firms engaged in greater tax avoidance (third tercile). The 
second column of Table 3 corresponds to firms engaged in lower levels of tax avoidance, the third 
column corresponds to medium tax avoidance, and Column (4) corresponds to a subsample of 
firms which present higher levels of corporate tax avoidance. In Panel A the measure of tax 
avoidance is CETR whereas in Panel B is BETR. 
Results in Column (1) support our first research hypothesis, which states that the ex ante equity 
cost of capital decreases when firms engaged in lower corporate tax avoidance increase their level 
of corporate tax avoidance. Panel A exhibits a negative coefficient for lower avoidance CETR 
(column 2) and a significantly positive coefficient for higher avoidance CETR (Column 4).  The 
negative sign for CETR in Column (2) indicates that the ex ante equity cost of capital decreases as 
tax avoidance increases, for firms with low levels of tax avoidance. The positive signal for CETR in 
Column (4) means that the ex ante equity cost of capital is increasing in tax avoidance for firms 
with high levels of tax avoidance. These results provide strong support for both the first and the 
second research hypotheses, being consistent with Moore (2012) and Cook, Omar and Moser (2015). 
Panel B presents a significantly negative coefficient for low BETR and a significantly positive 
coefficient for high BETR. Consistent with the results for CETR, the negative sign for low avoidance 
BETR indicates that the ex ante equity cost of capital decreases when low avoidance BETR increases, 
for firms undertaking low levels of tax avoidance. The positive sign for BETR (Column 4) means ex 
ante equity cost of capital is increasing in tax avoidance for firms undertaking high levels of tax 
avoidance. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, our findings suggest that investors perceive tax 
avoidance differently at different levels of tax avoidance. 
Controls for Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital 
In both Panels, LnBMRatio presents significant and positive coefficients, suggesting that firms that 
reveal both greater growth opportunities often exhibit higher ex ante equity cost of capital 
(Gebhardt et al., 2001). The coefficients on the three Fama and French (1993) factor are positive 
and statistically significant for most specifications, as expected, revealing that firms that bear greater 
risk exhibit higher ex ante equity cost of capital. The coefficient on Leverage is generally positive, 
which suggests that firms with higher leverage exhibit higher ex ante equity cost of capital. 
As suggested by Hutchens and Rego (2015) insights that lower analysts’ forecasts errors decrease 
the required cost of capital, Forecast_Bias exhibits positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
The coefficients on the variable Analysts are generally negative, which suggests that there is a 
negative association between ex ante equity cost of capital and the number of analysts providing 
earnings forecasts. That is to say, the ex ante equity cost of capital decreases as the number of 
analysts providing earnings forecasts increases. Allen et al.’s (2016) findings are consistent with that 
of ours – more analysts following decrease information asymmetry, and thus the implied cost of 
equity capital. 




The Role of Legal Origin 
In Panels A and B of Table 4 we investigate whether countries’ legal origin has an impact on the 
effect exerted by tax avoidance on the ex ante equity cost of capital, considering low and high 
levels of tax avoidance separately. Hypothesis 3 forecasts that the association between tax 
avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital does not vary in legal origins based on English common 
law, compared with other legal origins (French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil 
law). 
In both Panels, English takes the value one for firms headquartered in countries with English 
common law legal origin, and zero otherwise. Firms based in countries using English common law 
present a negative coefficient for low levels of avoidance and for higher levels of tax avoidance the 
coefficient is positive. Results suggest that in English common law countries the effect of corporate 
tax avoidance on ex ante equity cost of capital is lower than that in other legal origins. That is to 
say, firms decrease cost of capital when they increase the level of tax avoidance towards an optimal 
level, although the decrease is less accentuate in countries based on English common law. On the 
other hand, when the level of tax avoidance increases and diverges from the optimal level, the 
increase in cost of capital derived from tax avoidance strategies is attenuated for English common 
law countries compared to countries with different legal origins. Collectively, these findings indicate 
that a country’s institutional characteristics may change the effect exerted by tax avoidance in the 
ex ante equity cost of capital, which does not provide support for the third and exploratory 
research hypothesis. 
Robustness Check 
We carry out a battery of robustness checks, which all corroborate the original findings. Despite 
the fixed effect specification per country, year, and industry, the main estimations does not consider 
country-specific controls. Therefore, a measure of countries’ culture (defined as Trust in politicians) 
is applied in the base estimation as control at country level. Trust in politicians is, according to 
Robinson and Slemrod (2012), the most coherent and crucial non-tax rate determinant of the 
variability amongst tax systems. For parsimony, these results are not reported as they are very 
similar to the main results in Table 3. 
One potential concern about our setting is the potential influence of the financial crisis from 2008 
onwards. We perform Model (3) with the inclusion of an interaction term. Years2005-2007 is a dummy 
variable taking the value one for the years 2005 through to 2007, and zero otherwise. Results 
suggest that on the run up to the financial crisis the non-linear relationship between tax avoidance 
and ex ante equity cost of capital was not affected. Nevertheless, the fixed effect specification per 
year delimited the variability of our estimations per year. We relaxed this assumption and as 
additional analysis the fixed effect specification per year was removed. In Table 5 we perform Model 
(3), with the inclusion of the interaction term and consider a fixed effect specification only per 
country and industry. In Panel A, the measure of corporate tax avoidance is CETR, while BETR is 




used in Panel B. Overall, we confirm the non-linear relationship between corporate tax avoidance 
and ex ante equity cost of capital, especially for firms engaged in lower tax avoidance (Columns 1 
and 2). Nevertheless, the interaction term in both Panels suggest that on the run up to the financial 
crisis the effect of tax avoidance on ex ante equity cost of capital was lower, especially for firms 
engaged in less tax avoidance. The intuition is that low tax avoider firms benefited more from 
increases in tax avoidance in the period 2008-2014. For firms other than low tax avoiders, the 
effect was also lower although with ambiguous statistical significance. Our conclusions fit with 
existent literature that suggest an increase in the cost of capital after the fall of markets in 2008 
(e.g., King (2009) and Mokhova (2011)). 
Based on the assumption that our main variable of interest (tax avoidance) is endogenous, we might 
be looking at data through a biased perspective. In fact, corporate tax avoidance might be driven 
by non-rate aspects of tax systems, such as complexity. Consequently, corporate tax avoidance 
might be endogenous if, in reality, such strategies accounted for non-rate aspects of tax systems. 
To control for potential endogeneity, Model (3) is performed through a two-stage least square 
(2SLS) approach. CETR (or BETR) is the endogenous variable and as instrumental variables (IV) are 
used two variables from Robinson and Slemrod (2012), namely: a procedural measure of tax 
administration, and an enforcement measure (Table 1 for definitions). Both variables are the 
principal components which combine five tax system measures each (other than tax rates).3 The 
Procedural measure comprises the principal component of five measures that capture 
government’s ability to compute or collect income from taxpayers, while Enforcement is the 
principal component of five measures that “reflect the extent to which revenue bodies are 
empowered to fulfil their objectives of accurately assessing tax liabilities and collecting revenue” 
(Robinson and Slemrod, 2012). 
The variable that proxies for the maximum penalty for failure to correctly reported tax liability 
which is included in the enforcement measure was excluded due to missing data for several 
countries. Thus, we re-estimated the principal components with this exclusion and the index 
properties were not significantly changeable, as the index obtained by us with the same procedure 
of Robinson and Slemrod (2012) exhibits very strong correlation with the index originally 
computed by the authors (corr: 0.993; t-stat: 211.6). 
Table 6 summarises the estimation of the 2SLS approach using two instruments: Procedural and 
Enforcement. In Columns (1) and (2) we estimate the effect of tax avoidance on ex ante equity 
cost of capital for firms engaged in less tax avoidance, while estimations for firms engaged in greater 
tax avoidance are presented in the remaining columns. The 2SLS approach reinforces our results 
for firms engaged in lower levels of corporate tax avoidance. 
                                                 
3 The data comes from Robinson and Slemrod’s (2012) work, which is primarily sourced from T the OECD, 
Bureau International Database, US Census, and the Fraser Institute. 





Following the significant and recent contributions of Moore (2012), Cook, Omar and Moser (2015), 
and Kim et al. (2016), in order to understand the longstanding relationship between corporate tax 
avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital for the US, this study examines the association between 
corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital in Europe.  
Our results suggest that investors’ perception of tax avoidance appear to change at different levels 
of tax avoidance. We provide evidence that as tax avoidance increases from low avoidance to high 
avoidance, the ex ante equity cost of capital appears to decrease, which indicates that investors 
recognize the benefits of tax avoidance to surpass the costs. On the other hand, when firms that 
undertake high levels of tax avoidance engage in greater tax avoidance, the ex ante equity cost of 
capital appears to increase, indicating that investors perceive the costs of tax avoidance to surpass 
the benefits. These results imply that the relationship between tax avoidance and ex ante equity 
cost of capital is U-shaped, as suggested by Cook, Omar and Moser (2015). 
Additionally, we investigate whether a countries’ institutional characteristics (legal origin) might 
change the effect exerted by tax avoidance in the ex ante equity cost of capital, conjecturing that 
the association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital may well vary with 
countries’ legal origin (English common law, French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian 
civil law). Our results indicate that a country’s institutional characteristics change the effect exerted 
by tax avoidance in the ex ante equity cost of capital, which is lower for English common law 
countries, compared to countries with other legal origins.  
Our findings make a contribution to the literature in the sense that the results regarding the U-
shaped relationship between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital are based on European 
firms whereas previous literature focus on US firms. Moreover, we try to understand whether 
such relation varies with countries legal origin, although we consider that more research is needed 
on this topic. Despite the lack of data for the analysis of the role of legal origin, resulting in limited 
conclusions, we believe this topic require further research. Moreover, a country specific study 
including both public and private firms may yield important findings to current debate on this topic. 
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Variable Source Definition 
Equity Cost of Capital a Ex ante equity cost of capital from Easton (2004), calculated as of December 
31 following the close of the fiscal year. 





CETR is computed as cash taxes paid each period divided by the corresponding 
pre-tax book income. All observations with negative cash taxes paid or 
negative pre-tax income are excluded. CETR with observations higher than 1 
or lower than 0 are excluded. CETR is multiplied by -1, such that tax avoidance 
is increasing in CETR. 
BETR 
 
a BETR is computed as tax expense divided by pre-tax book income. All 
observations with negative tax expense or negative pre-tax income are 
excluded. BETR is multiplied by -1, so that tax avoidance is increasing in BETR. 
LnMVE a Log of market value of equity, in which market value of equity is derived from 
year end stock price. 
LnBMRatio a The natural log of the book-to-market ratio is computed as book value of 
equity divided by market value of equity. 
BMKT, BHML, and 
BSMB 
b The Fama and French (1993) risk factors are computed by regressing a firm’s 
annual stock returns. See chapter 3.4. 
PPEGT a Gross Property Plant and Equipment (PPEGT) scaled by lagged total assets. 
Leverage a Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt over lagged total assets. 
Capex a Total capital expenditures for fiscal year (Capex), scaled by lagged total assets. 
Forecast_Bias 
 
a An estimate of IBES analysts EPS forecast bias, calculated as the prior year 
earnings per share forecast from IBES minus this year’s net income, scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
Analysts a The variable Analysts captures the number of analysts providing earnings 
forecasts. 
TA a Total Accruals, aims to capture tax avoidance arising due to earnings 
management, it is computed as earnings before taxes minus operational cash 
flow, scaled lagged total assets. 
Procedural (IV) c Procedural measure of tax administration, which consists on the principal 
component of five procedural measures of tax systems, namely: self-assess, 
withhold, withhold type, report, and match. 
Enforcement (IV) c Enforcement measure, which consists on the principal component of five 
enforcement measures of tax systems, namely: collect, bank, verify, penalty, 
and coverage. 
Trust - Cultural variable concerning trust in politicians, following Robinson and 
Slemrod (2012). 
Legal Origin - Legal origin following La Porta et al. (1998) definition. 
a Thomson Reuters DataStream / Eikon and own calculations 
b Fama and French (93): http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f- f_factors.html 
c Robinson and Slemrod (2012) 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 














Figure 1: U-shaped relation between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity 
cost of capital 
Notes for Figure1: 
The U-shaped association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital is presented in the 
figure below. It states that when firms with a low level of tax avoidance engage in additional tax 
avoidance, the firm’s ex ante equity cost of capital decreases towards an optimal level. On the other 
hand, when firms with a high level of tax avoidance engage in greater corporate tax avoidance, the firm’s 
ex ante equity cost of capital increases. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Composition 
Panel A: Firm Level Variables 










         
Equity Cost of Capital 4,630 0.000 0. 053 0.100 0.155 0.368 0.111 0.078 
CETR 3,612 -0.999 -0.392 -0.264 -0.155 0.000 -0.293 0.194 
BETR 4,630 -0.997 -0.250 -0.139 -0.066 0.000 -0.186 0.177 
LnBMRatio 4,630 -7.676 -1.265 -0.721 -0.204 2.752 -0.770 0.901 
BMKT 4,630 -0.081 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.200 0.007 0.010 
BSMB 4,630 -0.110 -0.007 0.003 0.014 0.270 0.004 0.020 
BHML 4,630 -0.275 -0.011 0.000 0.012 0.227 0.001 0.026 
Leverage 4,630 0.000 0.019 0.110 0.233 0.888 0.147 0.143 
PPEGT 4,630 -0.180 0.044 0.142 0.314 1.306 0.208 0.205 
Capex 4,630 -0.024 0.016 0.034 0.061 0.423 0.457 0.045 
Forecast_Bias 4,630 -0.651 -0.082 -0.048 -0.024 0.880 -0.062 0.066 
Analysts 4,630 1.000 3.000 7.000 16.00 44.00 10.37 9.312 
TA 4,630 -0.665 -0.044 -0.010 0.026 79.16 0.011 1.166 
         
         
Panel B: Sample Composition Per Country      
Austria  98       
Belgium  142       
Bulgaria  9       
Croatia  12       
Czech Republic 16       
Denmark  145       
Finland  175       
France  630       
Germany  668       
Greece  94       
Hungary  17       
Italy  323       
Luxembourg  36       
Netherlands  182       
Norway  188       
Poland  210       
Portugal  46       
Romania  15       
Slovenia  21       
Spain  206       
Sweden  419       
Switzerland  305       
Ukraine  97       
United Kingdom 576       
Total  4,630       













Expected Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
CETR -/?/+  -0.024* -0.002 0.070* 
   (0.013) (0.039) (0.037) 
CETR Low - -0.008*    
  (0.005)    
CETR High + -0.015    
  (0.020)    
LnBMRatio + 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
BMKT + 0.416*** 0.591** 0.041 0.441 
  (0.151) (0.241) (0.241) (0.268) 
BSMB + 0.165*** 0.240** 0.025 0.176* 
  (0.063) (0.115) (0.121) (0.097) 
BHML + 0.178*** 0.256*** 0.044 0.150 
  (0.061) (0.097) (0.112) (0.113) 
Leverage ? -0.007 0.008 0.005 -0.034** 
  (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
PPEGT ? -0.001 -0.030** -0.016 0.021* 
  (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
Capex - -0.058** 0.060 -0.059 -0.131*** 
  (0.029) (0.064) (0.063) (0.038) 
Forecast_Bias + 0.078*** 0.088* 0.038 0.023 
  (0.022) (0.046) (0.043) (0.035) 
Analysts - -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TA ? 0.002*** -0.033 -0.061* 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.034) (0.034) (0.000) 
Constant  0.137*** 0.119*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
  (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
Fixed Effects:      
Year  YES YES YES YES 
Country  YES YES YES YES 
Industry  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  3,653 1,238 1,225 1,190 
R-squared  0.361 0.353 0.421 0.347 
Table 3: Effect of Tax Avoidance on Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital 
Panel A: CETR as measure of corporate tax avoidance 
 














Expected Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
BETR -/?/+  -0.044*** 0.007 0.055 
   (0.012) (0.045) (0.059) 
BETR Low - -0.029***    
  (0.006)    
BETR High + 0.000    
  (0.037)    
LnBMRatio + 0.010*** 0.005* 0.013*** 0.012*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
BMKT + 0.192 0.075 0.653*** -0.097 
  (0.130) (0.200) (0.218) (0.205) 
BSMB + 0.092 0.076 0.100 0.165* 
  (0.057) (0.093) (0.104) (0.097) 
BHML + 0.109** 0.029 0.204** 0.067 
  (0.053) (0.083) (0.097) (0.092) 
Leverage ? -0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.017 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
PPEGT ? 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.008 
  (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Capex - -0.043 -0.068 -0.070 -0.042 
  (0.029) (0.052) (0.049) (0.048) 
Forecast_Bias + 0.076*** 0.126*** 0.059 0.063*** 
  (0.017) (0.046) (0.038) (0.022) 
Analysts - -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TA ? 0.002*** -0.031 -0.007 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.029) (0.029) (0.000) 
Constant  0.133*** 0.150*** 0.115*** 0.145*** 
  (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) 
Fixed Effects:      
Year  YES YES YES YES 
Country  YES YES YES YES 
Industry  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  4,630 1,473 1,536 1,621 
R-squared  0.349 0.379 0.363 0.311 
 
Table 3: Effect of Tax Avoidance on Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital 
Panel B: BETR as measure of corporate tax avoidance 




Notes for Table 3: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 
The results are from the estimation of model (3), using as tax avoidance (TaxAv) measure the variable CETR 
(Panel A) and BETR (Panel B). In both Panels the dependent variable is Equity Cost of Capital. The first column 
comprises the entire sample, while column (2) only includes observations for firms engaged in lower levels of 
tax avoidance. Column (3) corresponds firms engaged in the “medium” level of tax avoidance, and firms 
engaged in greater tax avoidance comprise the sample in column (4). Samples in columns (2) through to (4) 
comprise terciles from the original sample in column (1).  
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 











(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: CETR as measure of corporate tax avoidance 
CETR -/?/+ -0.030** -0.007 0.081* 
  (0.014) (0.045) (0.042) 
English × CETR ? 0.062** 0.038 -0.076 
  (0.026) (0.067) (0.063) 
     
Observations  1,238 1,225 1,190 
R-squared  0.354 0.421 0.347 
Panel B: BETR as measure of corporate tax avoidance 
BETR -/?/+ -0.049*** 0.002 0.083 
  (0.013) (0.052) (0.064) 
English × BETR ? 0.075*** 0.039 -0.256** 
  (0.018) (0.087) (0.129) 
     
Observations  1,473 1,536 1,621 
R-squared  0.380 0.363 0.312 
     
Fixed Effects (Panels A & B):     
Year  YES YES YES 
Country  YES YES YES 
Industry  YES YES YES 
All Controls (Panels A & B)  YES YES YES 
     
Table 4: The Role of Legal Origin 
 




Notes for Table 4: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ × 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 
The results are from the estimation of model (3), using as tax avoidance (TaxAv) measure the variable CETR 
(Panel A) and BETR (Panel B). English takes the value one for firms headquartered in countries with English 
common law legal origin, and zero otherwise. In both Panels the dependent variable is Equity Cost of Capital. 
The first column comprises observations for firms engaged in lower levels of tax avoidance. Column (2) 
corresponds firms engaged in the “medium” level of tax avoidance, and firms engaged in greater tax avoidance 
comprise the sample in column (3). Samples in columns (1) through to (3) comprise terciles from the original 
sample. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 








Expected Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: CETR as measure of corporate tax avoidance    
CETR -/-/?/?/+/+ -0.033** -0.038*** -0.023 -0.028 0.064* 0.057 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.041) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) 
Years2005-2007 × 
CETR 
?  0.027***  0.013  0.041 
   (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.041) 
Observations  1,238 1,238 1,225 1,225 1,190 1,190 
R-squared  0.299 0.303 0.381 0.381 0.341 0.341 
Panel B: BETR as measure of corporate tax avoidance    
BETR -/-/?/?/+/+ -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.002 -0.021 0.051 0.015 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.046) (0.046) (0.059) (0.063) 
Years2005-2007 × 
BETR 
?  0.023*  0.072***  0.184** 
   (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.076) 
Observations  1,473 1,473 1,536 1,536 1,621 1,621 
R-squared  0.360 0.361 0.340 0.343 0.281 0.283 
Fixed Effects (Panels A & B):       
Year  NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
All Controls (Panels A & B) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 5: Effect of Tax Avoidance on Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital under the 
Financial Crisis 
 




Notes for Table 5: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠2005−2007 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  
The results are from the estimation of model (3), using as tax avoidance (TaxAv) measure the variable CETR 
(Panel A) and BETR (Panel B). To understand the effect of the financial crises was added the interaction of 
CETR (or BETR) with Years2005-2007. The latter variable takes the value one for the period 2005-2007, and zero 
otherwise. In both Panels the dependent variable is Equity Cost of Capital. Columns (1) and (2) includes 
observations for firms engaged in lower levels of tax avoidance. Column (3) and (4) correspond to firms 
engaged in the “medium” level of tax avoidance, while firms engaged in greater tax avoidance comprise the 
sample in columns (5) and (6). The sample for the three levels of corporate tax avoidance consists of terciles 
from the original sample. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Dependent (Equity Cost of Capital) 
  Low Tax Avoidance High Tax Avoidance 
Expected Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CETR -/+ -0.825**  -0.459  
  (0.343)  (0.539)  
BETR -/+  -0.972***  -0.160 
   (0.323)  (0.408) 
All Controls  YES YES YES YES 
IV (Procedural)  YES YES YES YES 
IV (Enforcement)  YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects:      
    Year  YES YES YES YES 
    Country  NO NO NO NO 
    Industry  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  1,229 1,175 1,444 1,512 
Wald χ2  68.44 47.07 2,210.3 2,310.5 
R-squared  0.109 0.168 0.111 0.126 
Table 6: Effect of Tax Avoidance on Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital (2SLS IV approach) 
Notes for Table 6: 
The results are from the estimation of a 2SLS model, using as tax avoidance (TaxAv) measure the variable 
CETR (Panel A) and BETR (Panel B). In both Panels, the dependent variable is Equity Cost of Capital Columns 
(1) and (2) comprises observations for firms engaged in lower levels of tax avoidance, while firms engaged in 
greater tax avoidance comprise the sample in columns (3) and (4). As Instrumental Variables (IV) we use a 
Procedural measure of tax administration, and an Enforcement measure. The endogenous variable in the 2SLS 
model is either CETR in columns 1 and 3, or BETR in columns 2 and 4. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
